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When a practicing attorney in handling a common tort
case finds litigation necessary, he generally focuses his attention on the court where the suit is to be tried, and thus
upon the law of the state where the court is situated. In
most situations, a localized attitude such as this is entirely
proper, as the case will be decided entirely under local state
law. But, if some of the facts in the case took place in another state, the lawyer must beware, as a conflict of laws
problem may be involved. If he seeks to apply the local law
of the forum' in the case, to the exclusion of the law of the
locus, 2 he may find himself face to face with a question involving the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal
Constitution.3
Counsel must then consider and decide two questions:
(1) Should the action be entertained at all? (2) If the
action is allowed, where are the applicable rules of decision
to be found-in the law of the forum, or in the law of the
locus?
Focusing on the exact point under discussion, and remembering that the forum has a choice to make, to what extent,
if any, is the state court subject to control by the United
States Supreme Court under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause?
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1 The state in which the suit is brought.
The state where the particular facts, upon which the suit is based,
occurred.
3 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S.
*

CONST. ART. IV,

§ 1.

Where a state court by applying the law of the forum attempts to
impose on the defendant a duty not existing under the law of the locus,
the Due Process Clause may also be invoked. But where the state court
simply refuses to enforce a right existing under the law of the locus,
leaving the plaintiff free to sue elsewhere, only the Full Faith and
Credit Clause can with reason be appealed to.
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No answer is certain. Sometimes the Supreme Court interferes, but at other times it does not, taking the position
that the question is one of local policy for the state courts
to decide.
A judgment of a court in the locus state is pretty clearly
entitled to full faith and credit in a forum, except as to certain equitable decrees. 4 But in the case of rights not reduced to judgment, just when Full Faith and Credit is
required, and just when the Supreme Court will interfere,
has been the subject of much speculation, invariably ending
by a confession from competent authorities that the answer
is not yet in sight. Mr. Justice Jackson clearly sums up the
situation:
"I cannot say with any assurance where the line is
drawn today between what the Supreme Court will
decide as constitutional law, and what it will leave
to the states as common law."' 5
In the spring of this year (1951), a decision was handed
down by the U. S. Supreme Court which seems to be a new
development in the Full Faith and Credit-Conflict of laws
field. The case is Hughes v. Fetter., Appellant administrator brought an action in a Wisconsin state court to recover
damages for the death of the decedent who was fatally injured in an automobile accident in Illinois. The complaint
was based on the Illinois wrongful death statute, and named
as defendants the allegedly negligent driver and an insurance company. Wisconsin has an unusual rule of procedure
which allows a defendant's insurance company to be named
directly as a co-defendant in a tort action.7 Appellant, the
decedent, and the individual defendant were residents of
Wisconsin; appellant had been appointed as administrator
under Wisconsin laws; and the insurance company was a
4 Equitable decrees that are temporary, and not final adjudications,
are subject to later modification in the courts of the locus to the same
extent that such could be modified in the forum, without violating the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyers Clause of the Constitution, 45 COL. L. Rav. 1 (1945).
Q341 U.S. 609 (1951).
7 Wis. STATs. 1947, § 260.11 (1).
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Wisconsin Corporation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, pursuant to a Wisconsin statute which creates a
right of action only for wrongful deaths caused in that state,
and which was construed as establishing a local public policy
against Wisconsin courts entertaining suits brought under
the wrongful death statutes of other states. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the statutory policy of Wisconsin which excludes the
Illinois cause of action from its courts, is in contravention
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Consti-

tution.
Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion concurred
in by Vinson, C.J., Clark, J., Burton, J., and Douglas, J.
Prior decisions were cited to show that the Illinois statute
was a "public act" within the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and it was further said that Wisconsin could not escape its
constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties
created under the laws of other states, by the simple device
of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent.
The court then referred to the two conflicting policies, namely the "national policy" of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and the "local policy" of Wisconsin against entertaining the
suit, and said that it is the job of the U.S. Supreme Court
to choose between them. The Court chose the "national
policy", saying that the "local policy" must give way to the
stronger unifying principle of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
The majority opinion gave no reason for the decision
other than the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Several ostensible reasons are stated in the opinion, but upon closer examination they appear not to be reasons at all, but rather mere
rebuttals posed a priori to combat the expected criticism
of the decision stated in the dissent, written by Frankfurter,
J., and concurred in by Jackson, J., Reed, J., and Minton, J.
A close look at these supposed reasons is pertinent at this
point: (a) Black, J. wrote that:
"The state [Wisconsin] has no real feeling of antagonism against wrongful death suits in general.
To the contrary, a forum is regularly provided for
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cases of this nature, the exclusion rule extending
only so far as to bar actions for death not caused
locally."
It is agreed that Wisconsin is not antagonistic to wrongful
death actions in general. The policy of Wisconsin is clearly
and specifically stated to be otherwise, i.e., only against the
local enforcement of foreign created rights of action on
wrongful death statutes. Surely Wisconsin is not required
to enforce an action based on the Illinois statute, for the sole
reason that it also has in existence a wrongful death statute.
No reason is suggested or apparent for an all-or-nothing
approach, i.e., for holding that a state must either accept
all wrongful death statutes, or reject them all.
The Wisconsin court in interpreting the statute, clearly
stated the legislature's notion of public policy, and while
the provision may not satisfy everyone's notion of public
policy, such choice is not novel, and is not without reason.8
Logical reasons could be suggested for the-decision: (a) In
some cases there might be inconvenience in obtaining out of
state witnesses for an action brought in Wisconsin; (b) Wisconsin may feel that the Illinois courts can better apply their
own wrongful death statute; (c) Wisconsin may feel that
foreign wrongful death statutes, having unfamiliar provisions, would be difficult for a local court to apply; (d) The
measure of damages, not easy to explain to a jury even under
a familiar statute, might be different in a foreign statute;
(e) Wisconsin may fear that its unusual rule of procedure
allowing insurance companies to be joined as defendants
in tort actions, may make Wisconsin a more desirable forum
than other states, and that as a result, plaintiffs would bring
their suits to Wisconsin and thereby crowd the courts. These
possible factors, and others that can easily be imagined,
suggest that the local policy of Wisconsin is at least not
arbitrary and without reason. It could be suggested that
with so many valid reasons being shown for the local policy,
the legal profession was entitled to know why the national
8 The Illinois wrongful death statute contains virtually the same provision. SArra-HURDS ILL. ANN. STAT. 1936, C. 70, § 2.
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policy of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was held to be
stronger. Hughes v. Fetter offered no explanation.
(b) Justice Black stated that:
"The Wisconsin policy, moreover, cannot be considered as an application of the doctrine of forum nonconveniens, whatever effect that doctrine might be
given if its use resulted in denying enforcement to
public acts of other states."
It is granted that the doctrine of forum non-conveniens is
not applicable here, but other factors make this point not
crucial.
(c) Justice Black states that:
"We also think it relevant, although not crucial
here that Wisconsin may well be the only jurisdiction in which service could be had as an original
matter on the insurance company defendant. And
while in the present case jurisdiction over the individual defendant apparently could be had in Illinois by substituted service, in other cases Wisconsin's exclusionary statute might amount to a deprivation of all opportunity to enforce valid death
claims created by another state." (emphasis added)
Rather than being a factor in favor of the suit being entertained, the fact that Wisconsin is the only place, in the
situation here, where-an insurance company can be joined
as defendant, as has been previously suggested, is a good
reason for a refusal to entertain the suit. Otherwise, outof-state plaintiffs may rush to Wisconsin courts, to take advantage of the favorable procedure."
While in the Hughes case no hardship would result to the
plaintiff if the suit were dismissed by the Wisconsin court,'0
it was suggested that in other conceivable circumstances,
entirely foreign to the present cause of action, a hardship
9 It is generally conceded that juries allow a greater recovery in cases
where an insurance company is seen to be involved.
10 The plaintiff could sue in Illinois, obtaining jurisdiction over the
individual defendant by substituted service. SMITH-HUND'S ILL. ANN.
STAT.,

1936, c. 95%, § 23.

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO PUBLIC ACTS
might be worked on plaintiffs if a suit was not enforceable
in Wisconsin." This is deemed a "relevant consideration."
What has happened to the general rule that facts and circumstances other than those in a particular case under consideration, are entirely irrelevant, and cannot in any way
alter the decision?
With this the majority opinion ends. Let us now draw
back and survey the situation in the law of conflicts generally. Three natural questions appear to present themselves as to the effect of the Hughes case. (1) Where are
we? (2) Why are we there? (3) Where are we going?
(1) Where are we?
Despite the apparent confusion prior to 1951, it still could
be said that the U.S. Supreme Court did not interfere with
a state court's decisions on local policy in conflict of laws
situations, except in certain limited situations. The Court
began to recognize early that some legal relations were so
complex that the law under which they were formed ought
always to govern them as long as they persist. In the field
of commercial law, with rigidity and uniformity being of
high importance, a forum was required to yield in many
situations to the law of the state of incorporation or to the
law of the place of contract. Examples are cases involving
a stockholder's relation to his corporation, or the relation
of an insured person to his insurance company. If a question arises as to the liability of a stockholder of a corporation, generally the courts of the forum, under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, cannot apply their own rule to the exclusion of the statutory law of the locus. 1 2 Also, in actions
based on policies or certificates of insurance, the Supreme
Court has on occasion intervened to prevent a forum state
from enforcing a right of its own creation, to the exclusion
1 Conceivably, the locus could be a state which had no provision for
substituted service. Here, as a plaintiff could not obtain jurisdiction
over a defendant in the locus, suit would have to be brought in the Wisconsin courts if recovery was to be had at all.
22 Modern Woodsmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
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of the law of the state under which the company was chartered, or in which it was conceived that the contract was
made. 13 In both of the above situations it is generally conceded that the peculiar relationship between the stockholder
and the corporation, or the insured and the insurer, was
14
responsible for the result.
Another class of cases in which the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has been invoked, involves overlapping workmen's
compensation statutes. These cases need be given only
passing mention, because they were decided chiefly on "jurisdictional" grounds and the narrow concept of the pioneer
decision 15 has given way to a view that any state with a
substantial interest to be protected may apply and administer its own compensation scheme. 16 Even here, however, it
is apparent that the peculiar employer-employee relationship furnished the primary justification for the exercise of
control by the Supreme Court.
Thus, generally before Hughes v. Fetter, it appears that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause had been invoked to control
state court decisions only in earlier workmen's compensation
cases, and in certain commercial law situations. Further, in
every case, except one,17 it was merely decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court that the forum could not apply a right created under its own law to the exclusion of the applicable law
of the locus which negated such right. It had not been held
that the forum must both exercise its jurisdiction, and also
apply the right created by the law of the locus.
The one exception mentioned above is the case of Broderick v. Rosner.'5 A plaintiff brought suit in New Jersey
under a New York statute which provided that stockholders
is Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531
(1915); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); Modern Woodsmen of America v. Mixer, supra, note 12; John Hancock Life
Insurance Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
11 Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S.
615-6 (1951).
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
10 Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
306 U.S. 493 (1939).
17 Broderick v. Rosner, supra, note 12.
19 Broderick v. Rosner, supra, note 12.
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were individually liable to the extent of their stockholdings,
and could be sued at law. The New Jersey court dismissed
the suit, applying the applicable New Jersey statute which
provided that the stockholders could only be sued by an
equitable accounting, to which all of the corporation's stockholders and creditors would be necessary parties. The
United States Supreme Court held that under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, the New Jersey court must entertain the
suit, and must accord a remedy based on the New York
statute. At first glance, the case seems to be analogous to
Hughes v. Fetter. However, great stress was laid on the fact
that only a few of the many stockholders of the New York
corporation were residents of New Jersey, and that even if
substituted service over them all was legally possible (which
is doubtful), the cost would be extremely prohibitive. It
should also be noted that the case involved the relation between stockholders and a corporation, i.e., a commercial law
situation.
In Hughes v. Fetter, the relation between the plaintiff and
the defendant was not employer-employee, corporationstockholder, or insurer-insured, but consisted of nothing
more than a simple tort liability upon which the executor
of the deceased was suing. The liability of the defendant to
the plaintiff did not rest on a pre-existing relationship between themselves, nor was any need shown for the parties
to know with certainty, the result of the transaction when
they entered into it. 19 None of the typical factors are present here that have been seen in other situations requiring
interference by the Supreme Court in the state court's decision.
The Hughes case seems to have entered the conflicts-Full
Faith and Credit field in at least two directions. (1) This
is the first case clearly outside of the field of commercial
law, where a state has been required to both entertain a suit,
11It cannot sensibly be said that the parties contemplated the Illinois
wrongful death statute immediately before the accident. There is no
close analogy to a commercial situation, where it is desirable for the
parties to know what law will always govern when a legal relation is
created.
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and to apply the law of another state in contravention of the
expressed public policy of the forum. The case obviously
stands for the proposition that no commercial situation is
necessary. Where is the line to be drawn? Must all statutes
of a locus state be given Full Faith and Credit in a forum?
It is doubtful that the cases will ultimately go that far, but
no convenient stopping point is to be seen in view of the
extremely general language in the Hughes opinion. The
future is left to speculation. (2) The Supreme Court here
held that Wisconsin being the forum, must enforce the action
based on the Illinois wrongful death statute, when the only
effect of a refusal to entertain the suit, would have been to
force the plaintiff to sue in the locus state which created the
right.20 Broderick v Rosner is not analogous, as there the
application of the law of the forum would virtually deprive
the plaintiff of his opportunity to sue anywhere.
(2) Why are we thereT
No reasons being given, what did Mr. Justice Black have
in mind in writing the Hughes opinion? One possible
thought is that the case is a sub silentio application of the
conflicts theory of "territoriality" that has been discarded
in recent years by most legal writers, in favor of the socalled "local law" theory. 21 Perhaps the Supreme Court is
of the opinion that uniformity of decision under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause will be fostered by the application
of the older doctrine.
(a) Under the "territoriality" or "vested rights" theory,
it is the rights created by foreign law which are enforced,
the question of what law created the particular right being
in general, determined by the "territoriality" theory that
the law of a state exists throughout its territory and not
2
elsewhere. 2
0 It has been seen that suit is possible in Illinois, as the plaintlf
could get jurisdiction over the individual defendant by substituted
service. See note 10, supra.
a Judge Learned Hand is a great exponent of the "local law" theory.
Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions
in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARv. L. REv. 533 (1926).
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(b) Under the "local law" theory, in all cases where the
court gives relief, both the right and the remedy are created
by the forum, although the forum may, and often does, in
order to do justice, create a right as nearly as possible
identical with the right created in the state in which they
acted. According to this view, there would seem to be no
binding
conflicts rules which can be said to be in any sense
23
on any court which chooses to adopt other rules.
The "local law" theory is very difficult to square with
the Hughes case. The fundamental basis of the theory is
that the forum is left relatively free to decide any particular case as it sees fit. The law that a forum state applies,
is its own law, and it follows necessarily that if a state court
is to have any independent legal significance at all, it cannot
be told by the Supreme Court what its own "local law" is to
be. Thus, in the Hughes case, under this theory, the Supreme Court has dictated to Wisconsin what her own law is,
as it was held that Wisconsin "must" entertain the action
based on a foreign statute. The Supreme Court can clearly
overrule a state court's decision of what its own law is, when
such violates the Federal Constitution, but it does not follow,
as would result under the "local law" theory, that the Supreme Court can dictate what the law of each state must be.
On the other hand, the reasoning of the Hughes case can
be perfectly justified under the "vested rights" or "territoriality" theory. There is no stress on the independence of
the forum here, as it is the right created by the law of the
locus that is enforced. In the Hughes case, the Wisconsin
court was told that it must enforce the right created by the
law of Illinois, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Thus the effect of the Supreme Court requiring Wisconsin
to entertain the suit, is not that Wisconsin is told what her
law is to be, but merely that Wisconsin must recognize the
right created under another state's law. This seems to be
entirely consistent with both the "vested rights" theory,
and the concept of the freedom of a state to determine what
its own law is to be.
-3 See note 22, supra.
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One other possible reason for the Hughes decision-a
reason of policy-has already been suggested and questioned. 24 The opinion calls attention to the fact that in some
situations, if Wisconsin were allowed to refuse to entertain
the suit, the plaintiff would be deprived of all opportunity to
sue. Thus, in a case similar to the Hughes case, if the locus
state had no provision for substituted service, and the defendant resided in Wisconsin, the suit might have to be
brought in Wisconsin, or not at all. The Supreme Court
might have felt that an absolute rule requiring a forum to
entertain suit in every case, would both protect future plaintiffs, and be easier to apply, than a rule making the question
of whether the forum must entertain the suit, turn on the
determination in each individual case of whether recovery
in the locus was possible or not.
(3) Where are we goingT
Questions arise as to the future application of the Hughes
case: (1) Is the decision precedent for requiring a forum
state to enforce statutes of other states, in pure tort situations, where the question is only as to what law is to be
chosen to govern the decision, or is the case limited to the
situation where a state court refuses to entertain a case at
all based on foreign law?
Mr. Justice Black emphasized in a footnote to the opinion
that the case only involved the question of Wisconsin's entertaining the suit.2 5 He distinguished former cases where it
had been held that "prima facie" every state is entitled to
20
enforce in its own courts, rights based on its own statutes
saying:
"The present case is not one where Wisconsin, having entertained appellant's lawsuit, chose to apply
its own instead of Illinois' statute to measure the
substantive rights involved."
2 See pages 44 and 45, supra.
" Hughes v. Fetter, supra, Note 6, at 611, N.10.
26 Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U.S.
532 (1935); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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The language seems to indicate that the Hughes case was not
intended to extend to choice of law questions. However, the
decision did, indirectly if not directly, determine a choice
of law question, as Wisconsin attempted to apply its own
statute, barring suit, to the exclusion of the Illinois statute.
Did not the Supreme Court thus interfere with a choice of
law question, by requiring full faith and credit to be given
to the Illinois statute?
While the distinction may be somewhat hazy here, a
future limitation on the otherwise general language of the
Hughes opinion may have been indicated.
(2) Is the decision precedent for requiring a forum to
enforce rights based on statutes of the locus other than the
locus wrongful death statutes? If other statutes are to be
included within the rule, which ones?
There seems to be no language in the case attempting to
imit the decision to wrongful death statutes alone. It is
,ery likely, in view of the general language of the opinion,
hat Full Faith and Credit will be required of other types'
of statutes of a locus, but exactly which type is not forseeable
at this time.
(3) Is the decision precedent for
apply a statute of a locus, even when
ilar statute, and has a decided policy
Mr. Justice Black in the opinion said

requiring a forum to
the forum has no simagainst such statutes?
that:

"The state [Wisconsin] has no real feeling of antagonism against wrongful death suits in general.
To the contrary, a forum is regularly provided for
cases of this nature . . .
Is it not at least arguable that implicit in this language is
the thought that in the present case, perhaps Wisconsin was
being "hypocritical" in dismissing the suit based on the
Illinois statute, when actually Wisconsin also had a similar
statute in effect; but that in a case where a forum has a real,
honest to goodness dislike of and contrary policy to a statute
of the locus, no full faith and credit will be required. The
27

Hughes v. Fetter, supra, Note 6, at 611.
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distinction is perhaps narrow, but at least not inconceivable.
(4) Is the decision precedent for compelling a state court
to enforce an action based on the common law of another
state, or is the decision limited to rights created by statute?
Full Faith and Credit is required of "public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings" of every other state. While statutes have been held to be embraced within the term "public
acts", the common law of a state is certainly not a "public
act" or a "record". It is also extremely doubtful that the
common law can be held to be embraced within the term
"judicial proceedings", as in typical cases, this has been
held to refer merely to the applicability of a decision of a
state court, and in other states as affecting the relations between the parties to the original suit only. While conceivably, an opposite result could be reached, it seems likely that
the line of applicability of the Hughes case will be drawn so
as to limit the decision to statutes, and will not be extended
to the common law of sister states.
(5) Is the Hughes v. Fetter precedent applicable only in
situations where all of the facts upon which the cause of
action is based occurred outside of the forum state, or is it
still applicable where part of the actionable facts occurred
in the forum? In other words, the Federal Constitution
clearly requires full faith and credit, but does it also require
"partial" faith and credit? Assuming the latter, what part
of the applicable facts must have happened in the locus, and
what part must have happened in the forum? What facts
are crucial in this situation?
No attempt at finally answering these questions has been
made. A safe prediction cannot be made until some of the
future ramifications of the Hughes case are observed.
Just what the legal profession is to expect in the future
is uncertain. Conceivably the decision is precedent for making a forum state recognize all the statutes andpossibly all
of the common law, of the locus state, but logically this will
lead to an impractical result. But then again, at what point
do we stop and allow the policy of the forum to prevail? The
decision certainly gives no hint of any kind on the subject.
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Perhaps the end result foreseen by Professor Corwin at
the time of the workmen's compensation cases is not too
remote as a possibility. He said:
"...
But can the court stop at this point? . . .
The day may come when the Court will approach
the question of the relation of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to the extra-state operation of laws
from the same angle as it today views the broader
question of the scope of state legislative power.
When and if that day arrives, state statutes and
judicial decisions will be given such extra-territorial operation as seems reasonable to the Court
to give them. In short, the rule of the dominance
of local policy of the forum state
28 will be superseded by that of judicial review.
It could be suggested that the decision in the Hughes case
would be desirable, no matter what the basis, if the end
sought to be accomplished was compelling state courts to
render more consistent and sound opinions. If the decision
means that a forum state must give effect to some of the
so-called "procedural" law of the locus, a very desirable result would be accomplished. Examples of such "procedural" law are: statutes of limitation, presumptions, burdens
29
of proof, and statutes of frauds.
For state courts to blindly repeat in every situation that
these rules of law are procedural, seems to completely ignore
Corwin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. PA. L. Ray. 371,
385 (1933).
29As an example, take the statute of limitations. Generally, a forum
applies its own procedural law, looking, if at all, only to the substantive
law of the locus. The reasoning is that as procedural law should not
affect the outcome of a case, but merely the manner of recovery, the
forum might as well apply its own familiar law.
Statutes of limitation have generally been called "procedural", as
used in the non-conflicts case, as the statute merely bans the manner of
recovery, but does not disturb the substantive right. But then, the
courts carried this notion of the statute being procedural, over into the
conflicts field, and the general rule became that a forum always applied
its own statute of limitations, to the exclusion of the statute of the locus.
Thus, if the statute of limitations of the forum had run out, the action
was held to be barred, even if the statute of the locus would still allow
recovery. The plaintiff found himself possessing a substantive right,
enforceable in the locus, but unenforcable in the forum due to a procedural disability.

DUKE BAR JOURNAL

the realities of the situation. If the application of the
forum's statute, though denominated procedural, deprives
the plaintiff of his cause of action, such effect is certainly
as substantive as any other rule of law can be. A basic
truism of law is that procedure in any case should not affect
its outcome, and in a conflicts case, the outcome should be the
same whether the procedural law of the forum or the locus
is applied. But where only the law of the forum and not the
locus constitutes a bar to recovery, a different result will
be reached depending on which rule is applied. If it could
be assumed that Hughes v. Fetter means that a forum must
apply all of the law of the locus, substantive and procedural,
allowing recovery, where to refuse and apply local procedural law would bar the plaintiff from proceeding, then a
great blow would be struck for the advocates of sound and
consistent decisions in conflict of laws situations.
But at least until now, the decisions of the Supreme Court
have not indicated a definite guiding standard. Mr. Justice
Robert H. Jackson summed up the situation:
"Nowhere has the Court attempted, although faith
and credit opinions have been written by some of
its boldest-thinking and clearest-speaking Justices,
to define standards by which the 'superior state interests' in the subject matter of conflicting statutes
are to be weighed. Nor can I discern any consistent pattern or design into which the cases fit.
Indeed, I think it difficult to point to any field in
which the Court has more completely demonstrated
or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards of legal character than in trying to determine
what 3 choice
of law is required by the Constitution., 0
Jackson, Full Faith and Credlit-The Lawyers Clause o1 the Consti.
tution, 45 COL.L.REv. 1 (1945).

